Improve the earning through Jobs
Abstract
We analyze back to work incentives Taking Into account intertemporal gains and worker mobility Between jobs. Theoretically, we show That thesis Vary incentives DEPENDING on the Difference between Benefits and replacement salaire bad jobs. Ltr; aussi sensitive to the accessibility and Stability of Good jobs and wage inequality to the Between Good and bad jobs. Fact is all the thesis are factoring Among various social groups. Facing this kind of diversity, this year we illustrative simulation based on Labor Force Survey French, Which suggests mixing Policies That is the best way to Improve back to work incentives. For instance, one Have to make more steady jobs to Improve Employment gains for unskilled young men, it is better to aim good job Improve accessibility for the young women skilled and unskilled adults for and We Need to use all the chanels for the young unskilled women .
We analyze back to work incentives Taking Into account intertemporal gains and worker mobility Between jobs. Theoretically, we show That thesis Vary incentives DEPENDING on the Difference between Benefits and replacement salaire bad jobs. Ltr; aussi sensitive to the accessibility and Stability of Good jobs and wage inequality to the Between Good and bad jobs. Fact is all the thesis are factoring Among various social groups. Facing this kind of diversity, this year we illustrative simulation based on Labor Force Survey French, Which suggests mixing Policies That is the best way to Improve back to work incentives. For instance, one Have to make more steady jobs to Improve Employment gains for unskilled young men, it is better to aim good job Improve accessibility for the young women skilled and unskilled adults for and We Need to use all the chanels for the young unskilled women .
SUMMARY
We model the earnings return to work taking account of deferred gains, combined with opportunities for mobility on the labor market. We show formally that these gains are less dependent on immediate gap between revenues and earnings replacement of poor quality jobs, as the availability of good jobs, safety, and the extent of wage careers. However, these determinants are more or less favorable according to social groups. A simulation mobilizing IN SEE Employment surveys suggests that it is preferable to mix the incentive instruments given the heterogeneity of target audiences. Whether to promote greater job security for young men and little education, it is important to emphasize the availability of good jobs for educated young women or middle-aged men with few qualifications, or to act on all the levers for both young women with low educational attainment.
In France as in all European countries, women, little education, youth and seniors are vastly over-represented in non-employment, as in low-wage jobs and / or part-time. But these populations, where the risk of underemployment is highest, are often those with the least monetary interest in a job. This is especially true for young women with low qualifications who are most affected by unemployment and whose earnings return to employment are lowest. Conversely, male graduates of intermediate age are those with earnings in the course of employment are most important. Employment disparities can be explained by earnings inequality or, more generally, inequalities in incentives for employment.
To analyze these two inequalities, it is based on the framework proposed by Laurent, L'Horty, Maille and Ouvrard [2002] where the gains of re-employment were evaluated in a dynamic perspective. This framework is reformulated here in a logical trader who makes a complete analytical solution with a specification with three states on the labor market: joblessness, poor quality jobs (hereafter called "bad jobs") and "good jobs ". This is followed by a simulation of the stacked data from INSEE Employment surveys between 1994 and 2002 for a full score of the labor force in twenty-four social groups (based on cross age / sex / diploma / social background) . The exercise identifies the groups for which the monetary gains of re-employment, immediate and deferred, are the most problematic. It also simulates incentive policies and discuss their potential effects on employment by a particular category of workforce in different levers and incentives.
3 The first section provides an analytical breakdown of the earnings return to work. The second section assesses the gains to a fine partition of the French working population. The third section simulates incentive policies and discusses the implications for economic policy.
THEORY OF EARNINGS RETURN TO EMPLOYMENT
4 Many studies have confirmed that the applied monetary gains to return to work could be very low or negligible for many situations where part-time hourly earnings is close to the minimum wage (CSERC, [1997]; Laroque Salanié and [1999] and [2000]; Gurgand and Margolis [2001]). In general, if the income of an instant "bad job" is less than the income of non-employment, we will speak to the immediate loss of jobs recovery (static or trapping). Intertemporal analysis based on expectations of future earnings introduces an extra dimension. It may be a strategy to refuse misuse brings a total expectation of earnings than the strategy of accepting all types of jobs.
In France as in all European countries, women, little education, youth and seniors are vastly over-represented in non-employment, as in low-wage jobs and / or part-time. But these populations, where the risk of underemployment is highest, are often those with the least monetary interest in a job. This is especially true for young women with low qualifications who are most affected by unemployment and whose earnings return to employment are lowest. Conversely, male graduates of intermediate age are those with earnings in the course of employment are most important. Employment disparities can be explained by earnings inequality or, more generally, inequalities in incentives for employment.
To analyze these two inequalities, it is based on the framework proposed by Laurent, L'Horty, Maille and Ouvrard [2002] where the gains of re-employment were evaluated in a dynamic perspective. This framework is reformulated here in a logical trader who makes a complete analytical solution with a specification with three states on the labor market: joblessness, poor quality jobs (hereafter called "bad jobs") and "good jobs ". This is followed by a simulation of the stacked data from INSEE Employment surveys between 1994 and 2002 for a full score of the labor force in twenty-four social groups (based on cross age / sex / diploma / social background) . The exercise identifies the groups for which the monetary gains of re-employment, immediate and deferred, are the most problematic. It also simulates incentive policies and discuss their potential effects on employment by a particular category of workforce in different levers and incentives.
3 The first section provides an analytical breakdown of the earnings return to work. The second section assesses the gains to a fine partition of the French working population. The third section simulates incentive policies and discusses the implications for economic policy.
THEORY OF EARNINGS RETURN TO EMPLOYMENT
4 Many studies have confirmed that the applied monetary gains to return to work could be very low or negligible for many situations where part-time hourly earnings is close to the minimum wage (CSERC, [1997]; Laroque Salanié and [1999] and [2000]; Gurgand and Margolis [2001]). In general, if the income of an instant "bad job" is less than the income of non-employment, we will speak to the immediate loss of jobs recovery (static or trapping). Intertemporal analysis based on expectations of future earnings introduces an extra dimension. It may be a strategy to refuse misuse brings a total expectation of earnings than the strategy of accepting all types of jobs.
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